We analyzed this claim: is it true that

Binance attackers retained spending power on the blockchain after customer withdrawals were turned off?

How Binance Hackers Kept Stealing After ShutdownAI generatedConfirmed

Attackers tricked Binance's signing system into delegating wallet authority, allowing transfers to continue until the permission was cancelled on the blockchain.

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How Binance Hackers Kept Stealing After Shutdown

Flawed authorization allowed attackers to drain digital wallets after transfers were stopped.

Published
Quantum Otter — crypto markets and AI trading bots

In a nutshell

Attackers stole about $6.34 billion from Binance by hacking developer computers and tricking the exchange's signing systems into granting them wallet authority on the blockchain. Because this delegation lived directly on the public network, stopping exchange withdrawals could not halt the drain until Binance sent a separate cancellation transaction hours later. Binance has added stricter signing rules, but the protections have not yet been verified by independent audits.

Highlights

  • Attackers stole roughly $6.34 billion across blockchains without needing to extract Binance's private keys.
  • Setting up the rogue blockchain delegation cost approximately $15 in transaction fees.
  • The final unauthorized transfer finalized at 23:56 UTC on October 29 before Binance revoked access at 00:10 UTC on October 30.
  • Industry partners and security monitors helped freeze an estimated $2.85 billion of the diverted assets.

From the Editor’s Diary

Protecting digital assets requires limiting what automated signing systems are allowed to approve, because permissions written directly to a public blockchain remain active even after internal company networks are shut down.

Who's involved

  • Binance

    The largest crypto trading hub, running the affected digital wallets

    goal → Secure custody, absorb financial losses, and prevent unauthorized transactions

  • TraderTraitor

    A cyber group tied to North Korea and named by federal investigators

    goal → Retain control of diverted funds and bypass security systems

  • Blockaid

    A digital asset security firm monitoring blockchain movements

    goal → Detect illicit activity and warn partners

  • Security Alliance (SEAL)

    A cybersecurity nonprofit investigating crypto attacks

    goal → Track attacker methods and share protective guidance

  • CertiK

    A security auditing firm analyzing transaction safeguards

    goal → Identify independent controls to restrict unauthorized transfers

In short

A record theft shows that keeping crypto passwords secret does not protect funds if authorization systems are tricked into signing away control. Attackers took about $6.34 billion from Binance by making its signing computers delegate wallet management to rogue software. Because this authority lived on the shared public ledger called the blockchain, pausing internal exchange withdrawals could not halt the drain.

The event makes tighter, independent signing controls the most likely next defense for cryptocurrency custodians.

Whether these changes will succeed is uncertain until outside security audits prove the safeguards can block fraudulent approvals.

Previously in this story

How it unfolded

01

Illicit Transfers Expose Weak Signing Controls

2026-10-29 – 2026-10-29

Unapproved transfers started leaving Binance wallets around 20:05 UTC on October 29. Security firm Blockaid flagged unusual outflows about an hour later, though early reports could not rule out normal company operations. Binance soon declared an emergency as losses mounted into billions of dollars. Investigators later determined the core failure was not missing passwords, but the system that decided which transactions to approve.

1 source
02

Why Freezing Operations Failed to Stop the Drain

2026-11-02 – 2026-11-06

Outside analysts first explained why the theft outlasted internal freezes. Blockaid chief executive Ido Ben-Natan noted that while automated monitors spotted the attack within minutes, their tools only watched the network and could not block execution. Industry cooperation helped freeze approximately $2.85 billion, but Binance's internal report revealed how deep the intrusion went. Intruders had compromised an employee laptop through a fake recruitment scheme, reached wallet infrastructure, and launched code that persuaded signing computers to grant them wallet control.

The attackers exploited a feature known as EIP-7702, which lets a digital wallet hand temporary execution power to external software. By submitting 50 pre-approved authorization signatures, they ensured the delegated power remained valid even as transactions moved through. Halting Binance withdrawals could not erase permission already published to the blockchain. Binance used a multi-party custody setup requiring several approvals, which delayed sending an emergency cancellation. The final theft finished at 23:56 UTC, and Binance canceled the malicious permission at 00:10 UTC the next morning.

Investigations soon detailed the method and proposed fixes. Security group SEAL traced the attack infrastructure to North Korean cyber group TraderTraitor, noting that intruders held developer access for weeks before reaching wallet systems. Reports showed the setup cost about $15 in network fees to authorize an initial $2.5 billion transfer. Binance confirmed it introduced stricter delegation rules, tighter checks, and emergency cancellation steps. Security analysts noted that while internal software checks can be bypassed, hard limits built directly into signing hardware can halt large drains even when operators are compromised.

6 sources

Where things stand

The core facts of the breach are clear. Attackers did not steal raw private keys or break blockchain rules. Instead, they compromised signing computers to establish valid transfer permissions, which stayed active on the public network after normal company operations were turned off. Binance cancelled the rogue delegation, rebuilt its infrastructure, and added stricter authorization rules.

Whether these new defenses can block a similar breach remains unproven. Binance has not published outside audits, verified signing limits, or proof of an emergency drill. Future security will depend on whether automated signing systems can independently reject dangerous transfer requests, even when they carry valid internal credentials.

Sources

  • Blockaidtransaction-detection · 2026-10-29
  • ChainWardindependent-onchain-verification · 2026-10-30
  • FINTECH.TVmonitoring-versus-prevention · 2026-11-02
  • Binanceofficial-security-postmortem · 2026-11-03
  • CoinDeskindependent-media-briefing · 2026-11-03
  • Bloombergdelegation-cost-and-remediation · 2026-11-06