We analyzed this claim: is it true that
Attacker-linked XRP swaps continued completing through THORChain after the network announced trading halts intended to interrupt them?

Independent blockchain investigations establish further XRP-to-bitcoin conversions on November 12–14 after repeated interruptions. THORChain's documentation explains why trading halts do not freeze funds or permanently disable outbound transfers. The evidence does not establish that these later swaps violated an active on-chain halt.
THORChain XRP Halts Failed While Stolen Binance Funds Shifted to Ether
A network can announce a trading halt and still fail to stop stolen cryptocurrency from moving.
In a nutshell
When billions in cryptocurrency were stolen from Binance, hackers used decentralized swapping networks like THORChain to convert stolen digital assets into bitcoin without traditional exchange accounts. Although network operators repeatedly announced trading halts to block these transactions, the controls only rejected new swap requests while permitting refunds and continued network observation. This allowed millions of XRP to finish processing before new pauses, and when laundering paths shifted to Ethereum, similar cross-chain movements continued. Ultimately, the system's intermittent restrictions slowed down the transfers rather than freezing the funds permanently.
Highlights
- Hackers stole approximately $6.3 billion from Binance on October 29.
- THORChain trading halts temporarily interrupted XRP swaps on November 12 before trading resumed on November 13.
- Roughly 51 million XRP was swapped into bitcoin on November 12, followed by another 7 million XRP on November 14.
- By November 17, investigators found that 74,880 ETH linked to the theft had moved, with 2,100 ETH converted into 59 BTC.
From the Editor’s Diary
Decentralized networks lack central authorities capable of freezing user assets instantly, meaning that emergency trading pauses often act as speed bumps rather than permanent security walls.
Who's involved
TraderTraitor-linked attackers
The operators controlling cryptocurrency stolen from Binance, attributed by the FBI to a North Korean state-sponsored hacking operation
goal → Convert identifiable stolen assets into bitcoin and eventually obtain spendable proceeds while avoiding freezes and detection
THORChain node operators
Independent operators who validate THORChain transactions and participate in its decentralized network governance
goal → Keep the network operational and solvent while deciding when emergency controls should interrupt trading or signing
Binance
The global cryptocurrency exchange whose operational wallets were compromised on October 29
goal → Protect customers, replace stolen assets, and help investigators trace or restrain the proceeds
Liquify
An infrastructure company providing THORChain API and blockchain access services
goal → Repair degraded quoting performance and maintain reliable access for applications using THORChain
Elliptic
A blockchain intelligence company tracing the stolen cryptocurrency across wallets, exchanges, and blockchains
goal → Identify laundering routes, maintain screening intelligence, and help institutions recognize stolen assets
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The United States federal law-enforcement agency that publicly attributed the Binance attack to North Korea's TraderTraitor operation
goal → Identify the attackers and persuade cryptocurrency services and network operators to block movement of the stolen funds
In short
Following the massive theft of funds from a major digital asset trading platform, investigators discovered that automated trading halts failed to freeze digital coins while automated systems kept processing them. That is what the latest evidence shows at THORChain, a decentralized system for exchanging cryptocurrencies across different blockchains. After hackers stole approximately $6.3 billion from Binance, a global cryptocurrency exchange whose operational wallets were compromised on October 29, they used THORChain to turn stolen XRP into bitcoin. New findings show that another roughly 51 million XRP passed through by November 12 before trading paused again. THORChain reopened XRP trading on November 13, and approximately 7 million additional XRP was exchanged by November 14.
The distinction is technical but important. THORChain has separate controls for stopping swaps, stopping outgoing transaction signatures, and stopping an entire blockchain connection. A trading halt rejects new swap processing while continuing to observe incoming transactions and allowing refunds. A signing halt prevents outgoing payments from being signed, but it is a separate action. Node operators control these settings through Mimir governance votes. Emergency operational settings can require as few as three supporting active nodes, provided no competing value has equal or greater support. The dashboard's ordinary two-thirds voting threshold therefore must not be mistaken for the threshold governing every emergency halt.
A separate problem emerged publicly on November 12. Infrastructure provider Liquify reported that THORChain's XRP halt had left approximately 3,000 entries in its swap queue, around ten times normal. A software indexing defect made generating trading quotes consume approximately 75 times the expected processing power. Liquify said its fix was merged and running in its custom infrastructure, with inclusion planned for version 3.22. The affected systems served trading quotes; validators responsible for blockchain consensus were not affected. There is no evidence that this performance defect itself caused unauthorized XRP swaps to execute.
Previously in this story

Binance Claims Full Hack Refill as U.S. Seizes $1.2B
15 November 2026Customers have access to more networks while courts freeze stolen crypto, though independent verification of the refill remains incomplete.
Why a Crypto Trading Freeze Failed to Stop Stolen Millions
14 November 2026Halting a trading route does not freeze money already inside a decentralized network.
Stolen Binance Billions Scatter Across Blockchains
13 November 2026Hackers are moving billions in stolen crypto through thousands of digital wallets while forensic investigators struggle to agree on the final bill.
Accounting Gap Divides Investigators After Crypto Theft
10 November 2026Competing tallies of the record Binance heist leave a seventy-million-dollar gap across eleven digital networks.
Hackers move $225 million from Binance
10 November 2026Stolen funds are shifting through privacy services, but investigators say a large cash payout remains unverified.North Korea washes Binance loot through memecoins
9 November 2026Hackers used disposable tokens on NEAR Protocol to scrub stolen funds
North Korea moves $124 million into bitcoin
7 November 2026Hackers hide stolen Binance funds by swapping tokens into bitcoinBinance hackers convert $175 million to bitcoin
7 November 2026Intruders behind the massive exchange theft accelerated automated swaps into roughly 2,300 bitcoin across sixteen blockchains without cashing out.North Korea moves $46.4 million in stolen cryptocurrency
4 November 2026Hackers shift stolen tokens through software bridges into Bitcoin as US agents fail to stem the flow.
How it unfolded
Binance's Stolen XRP Enters a Cross-Chain Laundering Trail
The earliest independently traceable event is the unauthorized movement of cryptocurrency from Binance's operational wallets on October 29, beginning at approximately 20:05 UTC on the XRP Ledger. Blockchain investigators subsequently reconstructed the transfers, while the FBI publicly attributed the wider theft to North Korea's TraderTraitor operation on October 31. The on-chain transfers establish when the theft began; the available evidence does not establish which commentator first publicly reported it. Attention later shifted from the breach itself to decentralized swap infrastructure, including THORChain, which could convert the stolen assets without requiring a conventional exchange account.
The XRP Pause Lifts, and the Laundering Route Shifts to Ether
The latest phase demonstrates why THORChain's intermittent trading restrictions did not permanently stop the laundering. On November 12, a further wave of XRP-to-bitcoin swaps preceded another trading pause. At the same time, a THORChain community technical update disclosed that the halted XRP route had generated an unusually large swap queue, exposing a separate defect in the infrastructure serving trading quotes. Rather than producing a lasting restriction, the interruption was followed by another reopening on November 13. Additional attacker-linked XRP was converted the following day, leaving only a small residual balance. Independent blockchain tracking confirms that the resulting bitcoin transfers involved hundreds of intermediate XRP addresses and that refunded deposits were frequently submitted again. By November 17, part of the stolen ether began entering THORChain through similar intermediary accounts. The sequence establishes repeated interruptions followed by successful processing, not a proven exploit that bypassed an active consensus-enforced halt. A November 18 network snapshot adds another distinction: XRP trading and signing were both enabled, while Ethereum trading was halted. The reason for the Ethereum restriction, and whether it was a response to the newly moving stolen funds, remains unconfirmed.
Where things stand
As of November 18, 2026, the central finding remains confirmed: repeated trading restrictions interrupted attacker-linked XRP swaps but did not prevent the subsequent conversion of most of the stolen XRP. Elliptic's November 17 update estimates that only about 1.3 million XRP remains linked to the theft, while ChainAnalyzer's different accounting records at least 206.65 million XRP sent through THORChain after subtracting refunds. The figures are not identical measures of completed bitcoin payouts. The distinction between money deposited, refunded, processed and ultimately received remains essential. There is no newly established freeze or actual recovery of these converted funds, and Elliptic continues to assess that negligible proceeds have likely been cashed out.
The governance explanation is firmer than any allegation of a technical bypass. THORChain's documented trading halt permits refunds and continued chain observation; its separate signing halt stops outbound signatures, and a full chain halt suspends chain observation. Operational Mimir halts do not necessarily require the two-thirds vote displayed as the dashboard's general threshold. Consequently, the historical four-vote XRP signing snapshot does not by itself prove that a signing halt took effect, nor does it establish the ordering of earlier transactions. The November 18 dashboard confirms that XRP signing is currently enabled, but historical Mimir transitions, exact transaction-level state at execution, and validator decisions remain necessary to explain every November 7–14 swap individually. The Ethereum trading restriction observed on November 18 also requires an official explanation before it can be attributed to the Binance laundering activity. Investigators should next monitor whether the newly mobilized ETH is converted into bitcoin after trading resumes, and whether any of those outputs reach identifiable cash-out services.