We analyzed this claim: is it true that
unused digital signatures from Binance's October 29 hack can still reopen its compromised wallet after the October 30 cleanup?

Out of 50 attacker-held signatures covering transaction counters 18,914,775 to 18,914,824, only one worked, 34 were already outdated, and the final 15 became unusable after Binance 14 passed counter 18,914,903 on October 30 and reached 18,915,140 shortly afterward.
RafaVisual artistComing December 1
JolinaMarketingComing December 1
Binance’s 49 Unused Hack Signatures Are Permanently Dead
Blockchain records show the remaining digital permissions from the October 29, 2026, Binance theft expired because the compromised wallet's transaction counter moved past them.
In a nutshell
During the October 29, 2026, Binance cryptocurrency theft, hackers obtained 50 valid digital permissions to hijack the exchange's Binance 14 Ethereum wallet, raising fears that the 49 unused signatures could be replayed to reopen the wallet later. Blockchain records show only one signature worked—matching transaction counter 18,914,809—while 34 were already behind the wallet's counter and 15 pointed ahead. Before the attackers could use those 15 remaining signatures, Binance wiped the malicious code on October 30 at counter 18,914,903 and the wallet continued moving forward past 18,915,140. Because Ethereum transaction counters only advance and never reset, all 49 leftover signatures are permanently dead, leaving open only whether Binance's internal security controls can prevent a fresh signing breach.
Highlights
- Hackers bundled 50 valid EIP-7702 authorizations covering transaction counters 18,914,775 through 18,914,824 into one Ethereum transaction on October 29, 2026.
- Only the 16th signature, matching counter 18,914,809, took effect; 34 signatures were already outdated and 15 pointed to future counters.
- Attackers used the hijacked wallet to sweep roughly 167,464 ETH and 1.615 billion USDT in their first major Ethereum drain, followed by additional transfers until 23:56 UTC.
- Binance cleared the malicious software at 00:10:35 UTC on October 30 using counter 18,914,903, already 79 positions past the attackers' highest signed counter.
- Independent checks recorded Binance 14 at counter 18,915,140 less than an hour after the cleanup, proving none of the 50 signatures can ever run again.
Outcome of the 50 Attacker-Held Signatures
signaturesThe findingOnly one signature succeeded, while 49 were skipped and eventually rendered permanently unusable as the wallet's transaction counter advanced.
- This chart breaks down how Ethereum processed the 50 consecutive authorizations submitted in the attackers' single October 29 transaction.
- EIP-7702 signature — A digital authorization letting an Ethereum wallet temporarily execute outside smart-contract code at one exact transaction counter.
- It proves the documented batch of leftover signatures poses no ongoing replay risk, shifting scrutiny to Binance's internal signing safeguards.
Binance 14 Transaction Counter (Nonce) Progression
| Event | Wallet Counter (Nonce) |
|---|---|
| Lowest counter in attacker batch | 18,914,775 |
| Matching counter that activated takeover | 18,914,809 |
| Highest counter in attacker batch | 18,914,824 |
| Binance emergency code-clearing transaction | 18,914,903 |
| Independent check after cleanup | 18,915,140 |
- This table compares the transaction-counter range of the attackers' 50 signatures against Binance 14's counter during and after the October 30 cleanup.
- Because Ethereum counters only move forward, passing 18,914,824 permanently invalidated every signature in the attackers' batch.
From the Editor’s Diary
Technical rules on a public blockchain can permanently neutralize stolen permissions once an account moves past them, but they cannot stop a compromised internal system from issuing new ones. Strong institutional security still depends on strict approval limits and fast emergency brakes inside the company itself.
Who's involved
Binance
Major international cryptocurrency exchange whose Ethereum wallet was hijacked using unauthorized software permissions
goal → Stop further thefts, protect customer funds, and prove its internal approval systems are secure
Attacker network attributed to North Korea's TraderTraitor operation
Cybercriminal group linked by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to the October 29 theft
goal → Keep unauthorized access, drain digital funds, and exploit any leftover valid signatures
Blockaid
Blockchain security firm that studied the malicious code and flagged the attack after the first major Ethereum withdrawal
goal → Spot dangerous wallet permissions early and warn customers about security risks
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. federal law-enforcement agency investigating the theft and tracking stolen funds
goal → Identify the hackers, block laundering routes, and support asset recovery
Ethereum protocol developers
Engineers who maintain Ethereum's technical rules, including the EIP-7702 wallet delegation feature
goal → Keep wallet authorization and transaction-counter rules predictable so old signatures cannot be replayed
Binance customers
Everyday users and institutions relying on Binance to hold digital assets and process withdrawals
goal → Avoid financial losses, access their funds reliably, and see clear proof the breach is contained
In short
The 49 leftover digital permissions from the October 29, 2026, Binance cryptocurrency theft cannot be used to hijack the compromised wallet again, because the wallet's built-in transaction counter has permanently moved past every single one of them.
Binance will now face growing pressure from customers and security specialists to prove its internal approval systems cannot generate fresh unauthorized permissions, rather than defending against old ones. That demand is near-certain to continue, as Binance has not released internal signing logs or confirmed whether the compromised wallet has been permanently retired.
During the October 29 theft, hackers used an Ethereum feature called EIP-7702—a rule that lets a standard digital wallet temporarily run external software code—to take over a major exchange wallet known as Binance 14. The attackers held a batch of 50 valid digital authorizations signed for consecutive transaction counters, known as nonces, ranging from 18,914,775 to 18,914,824. One authorization matched the wallet's live counter at 18,914,809 and activated the theft, while 34 were already outdated and 15 pointed to future counters.
How it unfolded
Attackers reach the wallet-signing team
Binance's internal investigation, published November 3, places the first dated breach of its signing team on October 20. According to the company, attackers used an infected engineer's computer and a compromised internal artificial-intelligence tool to reach staff who managed wallet operations, following an earlier malicious download in June and a fake job interview in September. Binance has not released forensic logs to independently verify the October 20 account.
The first independently confirmed blockchain activity appeared on October 28, when attackers funded their Ethereum operations. The theft became public on October 29 as blockchain watchers spotted massive unauthorized withdrawals, including a public warning by researcher Spreek at 20:32:52 UTC after Blockaid had privately alerted its own monitoring clients. While those early alarms confirmed an active drain, they did not yet reveal whether leftover signatures could let attackers strike again later.
Fifty signatures, one successful takeover
Because Binance 14 processed customer withdrawals every few seconds, its transaction counter—called a nonce—changed constantly. An EIP-7702 authorization only works if its signed number matches the wallet's exact counter at the moment it arrives. To avoid missing their window, the attackers obtained 50 valid signatures from Binance's compromised signing service covering consecutive counters from 18,914,775 to 18,914,824, all pointing to the same malicious software on Ethereum's main network.
The attackers bundled all 50 signatures into a single transaction in descending order, starting at 18,914,824 and counting down to 18,914,775. Ethereum read the list from top to bottom: it skipped the first 15 signatures because their counters were still ahead of the wallet, accepted the 16th signature at counter 18,914,809, and immediately bumped the wallet's counter to 18,914,810. That single match installed the malicious software while leaving the remaining 34 signatures outdated and the top 15 temporarily unused.
Once active, the malicious code gave a separate attacker account full authority to move funds out of Binance 14. Within minutes, the attacker swept roughly 167,464 ETH and 63 types of tokens, including 1.615 billion USDT, and used Binance 14's authority to drain another Binance smart account. Ethereum's software worked exactly as designed; the failure lay entirely in Binance's internal signing controls.
A delegation survives the withdrawal shutdown
Halting ordinary exchange withdrawals did not stop the Ethereum drain. Unlike a single payment, an EIP-7702 code delegation stays attached to a wallet until a new valid authorization clears it, meaning incoming funds kept flowing into Binance 14 and attackers kept sweeping them out. This persistence made the 15 leftover higher-counter signatures look especially dangerous while the wallet remained active.
Because Binance 14 relied on multiparty computation—a security setup that splits signing power among several systems so no single key exists—engineers needed a special procedure to issue an emergency reset. After a final unauthorized sweep of roughly 2,961.9 ETH at 23:56 UTC, Binance 14 sent a self-addressed transaction at 00:10:35 UTC on October 30 that pointed the wallet to an empty zero address, wiping out the malicious software.
That reset transaction also settled the fate of the 15 unused signatures. The clearing transaction ran at counter 18,914,903 and processed its cleanup permission at counter 18,914,904—already 79 steps past the attackers' highest signature at 18,914,824. Independent checks recorded Binance 14 continuing normal activity at counter 18,915,140 less than an hour later, confirming the entire batch had expired.
Why revocation and replay protection are different
Clearing malicious code and blocking old signatures are two separate steps under Ethereum's rules. A digital signature remains mathematically valid forever, so if a wallet wipes out bad code while its counter is still low, an attacker holding a signature for a higher counter could still submit it later. In Binance 14's case, however, normal traffic had already pushed the wallet's counter far above the attackers' highest signature before the cleanup happened, closing both doors at once.
Once blockchain data ruled out a replay of those 50 signatures, scrutiny turned to how the attackers obtained them in the first place. On October 31, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation blamed the theft on North Korea's TraderTraitor hacking group. Three days later, Binance released a fuller report detailing the compromised employee devices, fake recruitment, and misused internal AI tool, though it did not publish raw signing logs to explain why its account described 50 signing operations while the blockchain showed 50 permissions packed into one transaction.
The question moves from signatures to security guarantees
By early November, independent reconstructions by Rekt, GCSA, HakHub, CoinDesk, and Maborak Technologies all reached the same verdict: only one of the 50 signatures took effect, and none of the remaining 49 can ever run on Ethereum again. That consensus settled the technical fear around the known batch, shifting public attention toward whether Binance's rebuilt controls can prevent a fresh signing breach.
On November 11, Reuters reported security specialists questioning why major exchanges still lack automatic circuit breakers capable of halting abnormal transfers even after an employee's laptop is breached. Jonathan Alexander of blockchain security firm OpenZeppelin said exchanges can add strong operational safeguards without sacrificing decentralization, while Alex Pruden of cybersecurity firm Project Eleven warned that compromised internal AI tools can magnify an attacker's reach. Neither expert found any sign of a new attack on Binance 14, leaving the open issue squarely on Binance's willingness to disclose audit proof.
Where things stand
As of November 12, 2026, blockchain evidence confirms that none of the 50 documented signatures from the October 29 theft can be replayed against Binance 14. Only the signature at transaction counter 18,914,809 took effect, while 34 were already outdated and 15 expired once the wallet moved past counter 18,914,903 during its October 30 cleanup and reached 18,915,140 shortly afterward. A public block explorer later showed the wallet's counter at 18,915,338, confirming it remained active after the reset, with no verified signs of any new malicious delegation.
What remains unproven is whether Binance's compromised signing service produced any other hidden authorizations outside that 50-signature batch. Binance has not disclosed audit logs reconciling every signing request, confirmed whether Binance 14 was permanently retired later, or shown that its emergency multiparty reset can now stop an unwanted delegation without the hours-long delay seen on October 29.
